When discussing the 'power of the Chinese emperor,' terms like 'autocratic state' or 'monarchical dictatorship' immediately come to mind. Throughout Chinese history, the emperor's political dominance intensified over time. It is commonly believed that the 'monarchical autocratic system' established during the Song dynasty reached its peak in the Ming and Qing dynasties. However, when we reflect on what 'autocracy' and 'dictatorship' truly mean, we encounter a surprisingly difficult question.Indeed, in China's political system, there were no hereditary aristocratic privileges or autonomous social groups capable of constraining imperial power. Yet this does not mean that emperors could treat bureaucrats as mere extensions of their will and operate the entire state according to personal desires. At the central level, imperial authority was often constrained by powerful eunuchs and chief ministers; at the local level, de facto autonomy was exercised by gentry—local powerholders—and lineage-based kinship groups.Faced with this reality, should we explain it as a mere 'divergence between ideals and reality'?

Or are there unconscious assumptions blocking a more integrated understanding? While the Chinese emperor's power undeniably carried 'autocratic' and 'dictatorial' characteristics, what exactly do these terms signify?

Does 'autocracy' or 'dictatorship' imply that the monarch personally controls all affairs and makes every decision unilaterally?

Certainly, there were emperors like Hongwu of the Ming dynasty and Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong of the Qing dynasty, who, through strong leadership, enforced their will in governance. On the other hand, some emperors were deeply immersed in Daoism, neglected state affairs, and simply followed the advice of powerful eunuchs or ministers. Others were too young, with regents acting on their behalf. Should such rulers still be called 'autocratic emperors' or 'dictatorial monarchs'?

We can, of course, immediately respond to this question. 'Autocracy' and 'dictatorship' do not refer to what an individual ruler actually said or did, but to a 'system' that transcends the individual. That is, when depicting a nation's political structure, we envision a hierarchical pyramid with the monarch at the apex. In this framework, the office of emperor is granted absolute authority. Just as Japan's current constitution meticulously defines the powers of the emperor and prime minister, imperial China also specified the authority of each official post, with the emperor's power considered limitless.Yet this raises several difficult questions: Who established this 'system'?

Must the autocratic monarch abide by it? If the answer is yes, then theoretically, the 'system' precedes and even surpasses the monarch. In that case, how can we speak of an 'autocratic' or 'dictatorial' ruler who personally creates laws and制度?

This reveals a self-contradictory paradox inherent in autocratic制度.When asked, 'Why can an autocratic ruler govern so arbitrarily? Where does their legitimacy come from?

' can we answer, 'They are protected by a制度 that grants the monarch dictatorial power and have assumed the throne through legitimate procedures defined by制度?

' If so, then they are not truly autocratic, but rather a monarch bound by制度. Unlike transcendent beings such as 'God' or 'Heaven,' there is no external foundation in this world to support the legitimacy of an autocratic ruler. If a person or制度 could guarantee such legitimacy, that person or制度 would stand above the monarch, creating a logical contradiction with the very concept of 'autocracy.' The power and legitimacy of an autocratic ruler rest solely on the 'fact' that people, whether passively or actively, obey their commands.Stripped of 'fact' and viewed only through the lens of 'legitimacy,' the 'emperor' seated on the throne in the palace, supported by bureaucrats, differs little from a man standing at a rural crossroads, raising a tattered banner and proclaiming, 'I am the Son of Heaven, ordained by Heaven.'At first glance, monarchical autocracy appears to be a solid and powerful system. In reality, however, it is a fragile and dangerous political structure lacking any external basis for support. Chinese imperial politics has always faced the threat of questions regarding the legitimacy of the throne.Of course, if we relentlessly pursue the basis of power's legitimacy, we eventually arrive at the most naked 'fact'—a phenomenon not unique to autocratic rulers. For us today, the ultimate foundation of political power lies in the 'constitution.' A political party is recognized as the ruling party because it has obtained power through procedures stipulated by the constitution. Thus, the legitimacy of power stems from the support of the constitution.But then, why must we obey the constitution?

Even if the constitution is recognized by a parliamentary majority, who decided that a constitution determined by majority vote can regulate all citizens?

Even in a rule-of-law state with the constitution at its apex, we must admit that the ultimate foundation of law is not law itself, but politics—the force of people's actions supported by ideas.Then, what distinguishes the constitutional order from the autocratic monarch's order?

The word 'constitution' in English can also be translated as 'national system.' It can refer to a written constitution, an unwritten legal framework like the British Common Law system, or even a more abstract shared concept of 'national form' among people. Simply put, the term refers to the entire structure of state and society presented in the form of 'norms that people must follow' (in a broad sense, 'law').In a constitution-based order, whether codified laws or unwritten customs, there first exists a 'legal principle' and '制度' that transcends individual political actions. This legal and制度 framework forms the foundational structure of order. Each person's position within this framework determines what they can and should achieve—even the highest authority, such as a king or president, is no exception.In contrast, under China's imperial制度, the emperor stood above law and制度, being the one who created them. Of course, most emperors generally ruled 'in accordance with ancestral laws,' which was considered the ideal mode of governance. But the emperor was emperor not because he obeyed laws and制度, but because he (was believed to) possess the ultimate moral capacity to create them.If we consider that the bureaucratic system with the emperor at its apex has been the foundation of Chinese politics for two millennia, it might seem reasonable to view this制度 as China's stable and unchanging 'national制度.' But if we ask traditional Chinese people whether they thought about order in a constitution-like manner, the answer is likely no.The constitutional ideal of order can be imagined as a grandstand with many seats. This overarching framework exists before individuals take their seats and persists beyond individual replacements. Yet the Chinese have always focused on 'who established this correct order'—placing the center of order on the 'person.' Laws and制度 are indeed important, but who created these rules?

And even if laws and制度 exist, people do not naturally obey them—so who teaches them to comply?

One may have noticed that in Chinese metaphors of order, characters with the 'silk' radical (糸), such as 'tong' in 'great unification' (大一統) or 'gangji' (綱紀), appear frequently. Chinese order is not a framework that embeds individuals into fixed positions like theater seats, but rather resembles a vast net woven from interconnected personal relationships. At the top of this network—whose lower layers consist of ordinary people's family ties—stands the emperor, who grasps the whole and 'rules' it.In the theater-seat model of order, even if the top position is temporarily vacant, only that seat is empty—the overall structure remains intact. But in the network model, if the person at the top is absent, the entire net loses its central support.Extending the position of this central individual—the emperor—along the timeline, both backward and forward, draws a thread that runs through time and becomes the cosmic center. This is the 'Benji' (the emperor's biography) in the annalistic historical narrative. Historical events gain unity and meaning through this 'ji' (chronicle). The Tang historian Liu Zhiji commented: '[The ji of Benji] organizes the myriad things and encompasses all.' Without a center, the conception of overall order becomes impossible—thus, even when emperors were criticized for tyranny or folly, people could not imagine an order without an emperor.No law surpasses the emperor—this also means no law supports the emperor. China